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I. Introduction 
Fiscal discipline has been a concern for policymakers in many countries, and the local public 
sector has been the source of fiscal imbalances in a number of these countries. A prime example 
is the case of the United States. The recent recession that began in 2007 severely reduced state 
tax revenue and increased demand for government safety-net programs (McNichol and Johnson 
(2009), Boyd and Dadayan (2010). The result has been large and growing fiscal imbalances that 
are likely to persist for some time, presenting policy makers with several years of lingering 
difficulty in balancing budgets. 
Nearly all states in the US, except Vermont, have balanced budget requirements preventing 
states from engaging in deficit spending – that is, allowing planned general fund spending to 
exceed anticipated revenue in an upcoming budget year. To meet balanced-budget requirements 
many states have turned to broad-based cuts, rainy day funds, tax hikes and reductions in 
assistance payments. Policy makers are thus faced with the dilemma of either changing 
expenditures or taxes. Will changing one or the other actually lead to a balanced budget? 
Mahdavi and Westerlund (2008) have shown that addressing the growing fiscal imbalance 
problem is further complicated by at least two issues. First, the division of the adjustment burden 
between the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget during periods of fiscal retrenchment 
requires an evaluation of the initial level of taxes and expenditures to determine if it is politically 
and economically feasible to change them in the desired direction. Second, in order to determine 
which variable should be given temporal priority, one has to know whether changes in spending 
precede, follow, are independent of, or occur simultaneously with changes in taxes. 
The fact that states have to balance their budgets could indicate that state governments have very 
little opportunity to let spending lead revenue, or vice versa. However, balanced budgets are only 
a ex ante claim, and the state governments have used every opportunity to bypass this 
proclamation.  Consequently, state governments can act inter temporally and, thus, it is not 
unreasonable to expect a dynamic structure in the revenue or spending equation.  Dalhberg and 
Lindstrom (1998) using inter temporal utility maximization model have shown that local 
governments in Sweden under similar balance budget constraints smooth their consumption over 
time. 
This paper aims to explore the issue of temporal priority between government expenditures and 
revenue at the state and local levels in the United States. We undertake a panel approach which 
takes advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. Unlike many previous 
papers in this area, this study is based on a panel of multiple time series, rather than just a single 
time series, thus greatly increasing the amount of available information. Also, estimation for 
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each state is performed separately in order to avoid the possible aggregation problem associated 
with the data in earlier studies. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of the hypotheses on the 
relationship between government expenditures and revenues. Section III reviews the literature 
while characteristics of US state budgets are described in Section IV. The methodology is 
discussed in Section V. Section VI discusses the estimation results. The paper ends with a 
summary and conclusion in Section VII. 
 
II. Hypotheses 
It is usually assumed by policy analysts that a government determines the level of revenues and 
expenditures in such a way that it maximizes the society’s social welfare. Four possible 
hypotheses have been advanced on the inter temporal relationship between these two variables in 
the budgetary process. First, the tax-spend hypothesis envisages a unidirectional causality 
running from government revenues to government expenditures. Friedman (1978), an early 
proponent, suggested that while an increase in taxes only leads to an increase in government 
expenditures, reduction in revenue would therefore lead to a lowering of government 
expenditures. Wagner (1976) and Buchanan and Wagner (1978), on the other hand, argued that 
due to fiscal illusion, an increase in revenue would lead to a decrease in expenditures. They 
showed that expenditures funded by anything other than direct taxation leads the public to 
believe that the price of government expenditures is less than what it should be under direct 
taxation.  Fiscal illusion arises because the public pays less in direct taxation but more in the 
form of indirect taxation (e.g., crowding out effects and bracket creep caused by inflation). If 
indirect taxation declines while direct taxation increases, the trend could reduce government 
spending (Ewing et al (2006)). 
 Second, the spend-tax hypothesis suggests that initial expenditure decisions by the government 
lead to subsequent adjustments in tax policy and revenues to meet expenditure demands. Barro 
(1979) criticized the Buchanan-Wagner hypothesis of fiscal illusion. Given the Ricardian 
equivalence proposition that current government borrowing leads to an increase in future tax 
liability that is fully capitalized by the public, Barro argued that increases in government 
expenditures lead to increases in taxes.  Under this hypothesis, lower government spending 
would lead to lower deficits. The spend-tax hypothesis suggests a unidirectional causality 
running from government expenditures to government revenues. Bohn (1991), Mounts and 
Sowell (1997), Chang et al (2002) supported the tax-spend hypothesis whereas Jones and 
Joulfaian (1991) and Ross and Payne (1998) found evidence in favor of the spend-tax 
hypothesis. 
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Third, the fiscal synchronization hypothesis suggests that revenue and expenditure decisions are 
made jointly (Musgrave (1966), Meltzer and Richard (1981)). They argued that, when deciding 
on the appropriate level of government expenditures and revenues, the voters compare the 
marginal benefits and costs of government programs.  This hypothesis leads to a feedback 
relationship between government expenditures and revenues. Miller and Russek (1989) and 
Owoye (1995) found evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Finally, Wildavsky (1988) and Baghestani and McNown (1994) forwarded the institutional 
separation hypothesis which states that decisions on taxation are independent from the 
allocation of government expenditures. This hypothesis is valid in the absence of any causal 
relationship between government expenditures and revenues. 
 
III. Literature Review 
The empirical literature on the relationship between tax receipts and spending has primarily 
focused on the US federal budget with a few studies analyzing aggregate data at the state and 
local level. The studies yielded a range of results due in part to differing methodological 
approach, model specification, the degree of temporal aggregation, sample period considered, etc 
(see Payne (2003) for a detail survey of the literature).  
Studies that have investigated the relationship at the state and local levels have also come up 
with differing results (again Payne (2003) provides a detail survey, see especially Table 2). 
Furstenberg et al (1985) found some support for the spend-and-tax hypothesis using aggregate 
state and local level data for the 1954-82 sample period. Using data from 1952 to 1982, Marlow 
and Manage (1987) found the presence of  a one-way causality from state revenue to 
expenditures while there was no relationship between these two variables at the local level. 
Chowdhury (1988) re-examined the results of Marlow and Manage (1987) to find the presence of 
a feedback between local revenues and expenditures once the estimation is corrected for some 
statistical anomalies. Miller and Russek (1989) found a feedback between government 
expenditures and revenues at the state and local levels over the 1946-87 sample period. Using 
aggregate state level data for the 1929-83 period, Ram (1988) also found support for the spend-
and-tax hypothesis. 
Holtz-Eakin et al (1989) used a vector autoregressive model to examine the relationship in 171 
US local governments over the 1972-80 period. Controlling for federal grants, their results 
supported the tax-and-spend hypothesis. Using a similar panel approach to annual state level data 
for 16 countries over the 1955-86 sample period, Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1990) reported 
results which were consistent with all but the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. The US was one 
of three countries supporting the tax-and-spend hypothesis. Miller and Frank (1990) applied an 
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error correction model to aggregate state-local government data and found support for the fiscal 
synchronization hypothesis.  
Payne (1998) tested for the relationship at the state and local level and found significant evidence 
of relationship running from taxes to spending in 24 states. He found evidence of joint 
determination between taxes and revenue in 11 states while in 8 states the direction of 
relationship ran from spending to taxes. He concluded that in a plurality of states, revenue 
increases lead to further spending increases thus government cannot achieve deficit reduction 
using policies that would reduce budget deficits through the revenue channel. 
Mahdavi and Westerlund (2008) examined the tax-spending nexus using a  panel of 50 US state 
and local government units over 1963-97. Their analysis of the effects of the short-run dynamics 
indicated that while taxes affected expenditures at the 1% level of significance, expenditures 
didn’t affect taxes at the 5% level. At the 1% level of significance, however, they found a 
feedback between the two variables. Given their findings that expenditures seem to depend on 
taxes, they underscored the important role of taxes in controlling budget deficits at the state and 
local levels. 
 
IV. State Budget Characteristics 
The largest part of most states’ budgets is the general fund, also known as the operating budget. 
In most states this is where most general tax revenue (e.g., sales and income taxes) goes, and it 
pays for most of the state’s spending on education, health care, public safety, human services, 
etc. States’ major source of revenue is state taxes, mostly personal and corporate income taxes 
and general sales taxes. Most states have both. Nine states do not have personal income tax – 
Alaska, Florida, Nevada, new Hampshire, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and 
Wyoming; while five states are without a sales tax – Alaska, Delaware, Mntana, New 
Hampshire, and Oregon. On average, about 25% of state funds come from the federal 
government. 
Education and health care account for about half of what states spend. But states also fund a 
number of other services, e.g., transportation, corrections, pensions and health benefits for public 
employees, assistance to low-income families, aid to local governments, etc. 
Unlike the federal government, every state except Vermont is required by constitution or statute 
to balance its budget implying that states cannot pay for ongoing expenditures using borrowed 
funds. Most states, however, borrow for capital expenses, such as roads and schools, by issuing 
bonds. Capital expenses are typically not considered part of the general fund. Marlow and 
Manage (1987) have pointed out the creation of Off-Budget Enterprises in the development of 
public corporations and quasi-government units as a way to finance fiscal initiatives thereby 
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raising question about the assumption that states operate under a balanced budget statute. Some 
states only require the proposed budget be balanced and the actual, ex-post budget. Other states 
permit a deficit to carry over from one year to the next, while others have a no carryover rule. 
 
V. Methodology 
A number of recent fiscal sustainability studies have examined the presence of a long-term co-
integrating relationship between government revenue and spending. An important feature 
connected to the presence of such co-integrating relation is the direction of the causality between 
revenue and spending. In most cases, the presence of causality is examined in the context of a 
single country or state. Following Afonso and Rault (2009), we undertake a panel approach 
which takes advantage of non-stationary panel data econometric techniques. It is also relevant in 
the context of entities seeking to pursue sound fiscal policies within the framework of a federal 
structure. 
We use the panel data approach developed by Kónya (2006), based on a bivariate finite-order 
vector autoregressive model, and we apply it in our context to general government revenue, R, 
and spending, G:  
 
 
 
where the index i (i = 1,..., N) denotes the state, the index t (t = 1,...,T ) the period, j the lag, and  
p1i, p2i and p3i, indicate the longest lags in the system. The error terms are supposed to be white-
noises (i.e. they have zero means, constant variances and are individually serially uncorrelated) 
and may be correlated with each other for a given state, but not across states. System (1) is 
estimated by the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) procedure, since possible links may 
exist among individual regressions via contemporaneous correlation within the two equations. 
Wald tests for Granger causality are performed with state specific bootstrap critical values 
generated by simulations. With respect to system (1), in state i there is one-way Granger-
causality from G to R if in the first equation not all γ are zero but in the second all β are zero; 
there is one-way Granger-causality from R to G if in the first equation all γ are zero but in the 
second not all β are zero; there is two-way Granger-causality between R to G if neither all β nor 
all γ are zero; and there is no Granger-causality between R to G if all β and γ are zero. 
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This procedure has several advantages. First, it does not assume that the panel is homogeneous, 
being possible to test for Granger-causality on each individual panel member separately.  
However, since contemporaneous correlation is allowed across states, it makes possible to 
exploit the extra information provided by the panel data setting. Second, it does not require  re-
testing for unit roots and co-integration (since state specific bootstrap critical values are 
generated), though it still requires the specification of the lag structure. This is an important 
feature since the unit-root and co-integration tests in general suffer from low power, and 
different tests often lead to contradictory outcomes (Afonso and Rault (2009)). Third, this 
approach allows detecting for how many and for which members of the panel there exists one-
way, two-way, or no Granger-causality. 
 
VI. Estimation Results 
 
Variables and data: We use state government revenue and spending data as a ratio of state gross 
state product. Apart from the fact that ratios of nominal magnitudes are commonly used in the 
literature, it is also important to scale the variables for the panel approach (See Afonso and Rault 
(2009) on this issue). State revenue is measured by real state and local tax receipt while state 
expenditures is measured by real state and local government consumption expenditures. 
Government consumption expenditures exclude interest payments on debt and mandated social 
transfers to individuals, and are the best measure available of state and local government 
discretionary spending. It includes spending on education, public welfare, hospitals, health, 
highways, police and correction. The state revenue include revenue from taxation of sales and 
gross receipts, individual income, corporate net income, motor vehicle licenses, and 
miscellaneous revenue sources not shown separately. The sample period runs from 1970 to 2009. 
All data are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Figure 1 graphs the data for the 
sample period.  
Prior to estimation we have to specify the number of lags for each variable. We use the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Ideally, the lag structure should be allowed to vary across states, 
variables and equations. However, given the large data set that we have, it would increase the 
computational burden substantially. So we allow four maximal lag parameters and choose the 
combination which minimizes the AIC. We next test for Granger causality from G to R and from 
R to G performing Wald Test with state specific bootstrap critical values. Apart from the lag 
structure, the equations have also been estimated with a time trend. The time trend is a proxy 
variable that might substitute for some variables that are missing from the original specifications. 
Note that the bootstrap causality test that we use does not require unit root testing. 
The Granger causality test results for the null hypothesis Revenue doesn’t cause Spending (R 
doesn’t cause G) is given in Table 1. Note that the bootstrap critical values are substantially 
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higher than the chi-square critical values associated with the Wald test, and also that they vary 
considerably from one state to another and from one table to another.  In case of  nineteen states, 
the null hypothesis that R doesn’t cause G is rejected. Revenue positively causes spending in 
twelve states thus supporting the findings reported in Friedman (1978); while the negative 
relationship found in the remaining seven states is similar to the results given in Wagner (1976) 
and Buchanan and Wager (1978). 
The results for the second Granger causality test (Spending doesn’t cause Revenue) is given in 
Table 2. Again in nineteen cases the null hypothesis of spending doesn’t cause revenue is 
rejected. Among these nineteen cases, spending positively causes revenue in ten cases and 
negatively in nine cases.  
The summary result from the two Tables are reported in Table 3. This Table shows that there is 
no uniform relationship between government revenue and spending across different states in the 
US. This is similar to the findings reported in Payne (1998). A one-way causality from 
government revenue to spending is found in nine states - Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, 
Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin. Manage and 
Marlow (1987) and Chowdhury (1988) also found support for the tax-spend hypothesis at the 
aggregate state government level. Holtz-Eakin et al (1989) reported support for the tax-spend 
hypothesis in 171 municipal governments while Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1990) reported 
support for the hypothesis in Massachusetts.  Payne (1998) found support for the tax-spend 
hypothesis in 24 states. 
The fact that government spending follows revenue in these states suggest a pro-cyclical 
expenditure policy for the state governments. In this context, these governments could enhance 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making budget expenditure less driven by revenue 
availability. This would avoid the costs and instability that variations in public spending 
generate. The authorities could resort to medium-term expenditures that can be planned and 
insulated from volatile short-term revenue availability. 
Another eight states - Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana and 
Texas – show the presence of causality running from spending to revenue suggesting that a 
government’s revenue constraint adjusts to changes in expenditures with some lag in these states. 
Von Furstenberg et al (1986) also reported support for the spend-tax hypothesis at aggregate 
state and local government levels. Payne (1998) found support for this hypothesis in eight states. 
On the other hand, a feedback between these two variables exist in thirteen countries showing 
support for the fiscal synchronization hypothesis. These thirteen states are – Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. Unlike this paper, Joulfaian and Mookerjee (1990) 
reported a one-way causality from tax to spend in Massachusetts. Interestingly, institutional 
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separation hypothesis finds support in the remaining twenty states showing no relationship exists 
between spending and revenue decisions.  
 
VII. Summary and Conclusion 
The current fiscal crises that most states in the United States are facing are generally the result of 
a severe macroeconomic downturn combined with a limited ability of the states to respond to 
such shocks. States are facing increased demand for public services at the same time revenue is 
falling. In this context, this paper explores the issue of temporal priority between government 
expenditures and revenue at the state and local levels. An examination of each state was 
conducted to avoid the possible aggregation problem associated with the most earlier studies. 
The results show that there is no uniform relationship between government revenue and spending 
across different states in the US. In fact, about 40% of the states show the absence of any 
temporal relationship between these two variables. This is quite revealing given the current state 
of the debate in the academic and policy-making circle. A support for the tax-spend hypothesis is 
found in 18% of the states while the spend-tax hypothesis is prevalent in another 16%. In 26% of 
the states, the revenue and expenditures decisions are jointly determined by the government. 
Given the absence of any uniform result in the states, future studies should concentrate on the 
experience of individual states rather than trying to deduce general conclusions from all the 
states.  
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Table 1:  Causality from state government revenue to spending 
   Estimated  Test   Bootstrap Critical Values 
State   Coefficient  Statistic   1%  5% 
 
Alabama  0.347   3.654   20.996  12.994 
Arizona   -1.212   21.732*   23.741  16.990 
Arkansas  0.730   12.044   29.056  20.166 
California  2.017   25.997*   32.776  21.950 
Colorado  0.955   28.006**  23.912  17.005 
Connecticut  0.454   32.910**  28.077  19.733 
Delaware  2.996   8.044   33.021  23.835 
Florida   1.676   2.000   19.844  12.822 
Georgia   -1.061   42.056*   46.011  35.543 
Idaho   3.886   12.068   33.775  26.001 
Illinois   0.987   6.090   22.056  13.090 
Iowa   0.093   3.008   31.324  20.067 
Kansas   1.522   25.065*   30.056  21.923 
Kentucky  1.207   7.334   38.421  27.043 
Louisiana  0.993   15.044   39.055  26.273 
Maine   0.521   3.067   19.043  15.022 
Maryland  0.777   20.996*   31.560  17.556 
Massachusetts  0.932   34.034**  28.917  19.657   
Michigan  1.644   38.442**  29.659  18.253 
Minnesota  1.274   5.889   38.067  21.895 
Mississippi  0.944   39.021**  31.945  21.565  
Missouri  0.633   7.544   54.675  39.612 
Montana  1.676   56.231**  39.453  26.012  
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Estimated  Test   Bootstrap Critical Value 
State   Coefficient  Statistic   1%  5% 
 
  
Nebraska  0.993   4.996   31.078  17.055 
Nevada   1.422   13.955   39.045  26.034 
New Hampshire  -0.217   36.073*   42.454  29.184 
New Jersey  -0.662   37.956**  31.334  20.045 
New Mexico  2.711   13.887   47.022  35.442 
New York  -1.933   54.987**  40.867  25.011 
North Carolina  0.621   18.066   49.022  34.671 
North Dakota  1.002   5.097   26.910  21.428 
Ohio   1.301   23.532*   25.912  18.031 
Oklahoma  3.033   19.997   42.067  31.755 
Oregon   1.619   17.944   45.121  32.062 
Pennsylvania  -0.822   43.855**  40.411  30.944   
Rhode Island  0.729   9.112   32.997  21.625 
South Carolina  0.643   6.075   52.990  33.088 
South Dakota  0.056   3.034   29.676  20.610 
Tennessee  0.820   66.911   45.055  32.810 
Texas   0.062   5.830   25.089  12.022 
Utah   0.195   8.064   32.711  18.053 
Vermont  1.833   34.911   45.017  40.425 
Virginia   0.776   23.677*   31.044  22.073 
Washington  2.064   31.845**  28.944  18.453 
West Virginia  1.733   43.655**  41.355  30.811 
Wisconsin  -1.720   40.386**  35.922  26.121 
Wyoming  0.313   5.025   20.188  15.824 
**, *: significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
H0: R does not cause G. 
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Table 2:   Causality from state government spending to revenue 
	 	 	 Estimated	 	 Test	 	 	 Bootstrap	Critical	Value	
State	 	 	 Coefficient	 	 Statistic	 	 1%	 	 5%	
	
Alabama  -2.322   34.823**  30.888  20.612 
Arizona   1.622   45.008**  42.778  35.024 
Arkansas  2.957   40.768**  36.024  26.311 
California  -0.522   56.044**  50.322  35.088 
Colorado  1.399   23.886   49.026  40.655 
Connecticut  2.022   48.033**  38.009  30.156 
Delaware  1.412   14.733   30.055  20.643 
Florida   2.933   49.087**  43.011  34.017 
Georgia   1.722   18.565   55.127  41.057 
Idaho   0.712   3.998   24.773  16.992 
Illinois   -0.055   43.009*   56.443  42.629  
Iowa   0.821   8.387   34.054  21.712 
Kansas   0.292   12.822   28.944  20.155 
Kentucky  0.917   35.746*   41.846  33.068 
Louisiana  1.922   43.754*   50.922  41.318   
Maine   1.522   18.006   46.812  30.917 
Maryland  1.619   29.750*   32.923  26.847 
Massachusetts  0.739   39.044**  38.233  5.814 
Michigan  -0.712   45.622*   49.633  40.713 
Minnesota  1.663   18.478   43.714  37.065 
Mississippi  1.620   37.933   58.645  50.177 
Missouri  0.619   17.085   41.555  29.645 
Montana  0.632   17.006   33.854  25.759 
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Estimated	 	 Test	 	 	 Bootstrap	Critical	Value	
State	 	 	 Coefficient	 	 Statistic	 	 1%	 	 5%	
	
Nebraska  1.994   16.989   37.876  26.023 
Nevada   2.856   8.034   45.121  36.076 
New Hampshire  2.005   18.966   38.934  30.832 
New Jersey  -1.834   42.768*   51.887  40.943 
New Mexico  2.074   21.677   45.812  32.818 
New York  -3.000   64.776*   69.034  51.717 
North Carolina  1.069   6.937   34.813  28.053  
North Dakota  0.924   15.008   42.713  28.733 
Ohio   0.853   41.056*   32.990  20.870 
Oklahoma  0.765   12.078   28.987  19.643   
Oregon   1.072   10.887   37.834  30.712 
Pennsylvania  -0.827   55.711**  50.932  40.611 
Rhode Island  1.009   17.009   43.123  29.045 
South Carolina  0.432   16.044   38.334  21.645 
South Dakota  0.197   12.943   39.033  30.836 
Tennessee  0.004   9.778   41.730  30.061 
Texas   -0.069   56.767*   63.997  50.121 
Utah   0.044   13.843   39.612  30.124  
Vermont  0.529   8.935   23.833  17.035 
Virginia   -1.059   43.542**  41.445  29.754 
Washington  0.877   31.067   46.911  37.512 
West Virginia  2.054   54.099*   60.412  52.787 
Wisconsin  0.611   13.998   29.554  20.610 
Wyoming  0.810   16.573   42.111  34.934 
**, *: significance at the 1%, 5%  levels, respectively. 
H0: G does not cause R. 
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Table 3: Summary of Results 
 
 
    Number  
Relationship   of States   States 
 
 
Revenue - Spending Nine  Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Montana 
New Hampshire, Tennessee, Washington, 
Wisconsin 
  
 
Spending  Revenue Eight  Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois,  
      Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas 
 
Feedback   Thirteen Arizona, California, Connecticut, Indiana, 
      Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, 
      New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia,  
      West Virginia 
 
 
No Causality   Twenty Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, 
      Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North 
      Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode  
      Rhode island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
      Utah, Vermont, Wyoming 
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